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The growth of consumer credit in this country, the greatly increased
personal bankruptcy rate, and the unscrupulous credit practices of marginal
sellers and lenders who prey on the poor have led to a heightened interest
in consumer credit reform. In this article Mr. Clark examines the present
state of Colorado law relating to consumer credit and then discusses the
recently passed Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act and the more recently
proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code. He notes the needed changes that
the federal statute will bring in Colorado law, and, after presenting a detailed
analysis of the provisions of the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
Mr. Clark concludes by observing that the Colorado legislature should adopt
the Code.
INTRODUCTION
T HE magnitude of consumer credit in this country is over-
whelming. It presently represents more than $100 billion a
year1 and is steadily rising with a self-assurance matched by few
other segments of the economy. If residential mortgages are included,
aggregate private consumer debt outdistances the public national debt.
Some of the following totals as published in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin for October of 1968 are indicative: motor vehicle paper, over
$33 billion; other consumer goods paper, nearly $22 billion; personal
loans, over $23 billion.' Americans spend on the average about 15
percent of their disposable income to carry nonmortgage consumer
debt; if mortgage debt is added, this figure rises to over 60 percent.
Revolving charge accounts and check credit plans are being opened
with bewildering frequency. Four out of every five cars are purchased
on time. Sixty percent of department store sales are made on revolv-
ing credit. The credit card is rapidly replacing the Coca-Cola bottle
as the master symbol of our culture.
Climbing in direct proportion to the availability of consumer
credit is the incidence of personal bankruptcy. Although bankruptcy
*Associate, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado; B.A., Amherst, 1962; LL.B.,
Harvard, 1965.
1 FED. REs. BULL., Oct. 1968, at A-52.
2 id.
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was long thought of as applying primarily in a business context,
personal bankruptcies have risen from 18,000 in 1950 to well over
200,000 in 1968. The nonbusiness share of total bankruptcies is
now over 90 percent. The consumer credit boom appears to be fast
removing the moral stigma of bankruptcy.
The phenomenal growth of consumer credit and bankruptcy,
coupled with the recognition that unscrupulous practices by marginal
sellers and lenders primarily injure the poor, has led to a great
quickening of interest in consumer credit reform. In the past, state
legislation in this area has taken three basic forms: (1) usury laws;
(2) disclosure; and (3) provisions limiting creditors' rights. New
legislation on both the federal and state levels is revolutionizing
treatment of the consumer in all three of these categories. The two
major pieces of new legislation are the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act' and the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
4
Before exploring these new statutory departures, however, a brief
review of consumer credit legislation presently in effect in Colorado
is in order.
I. THE CONSUMER UNDER PRESENT COLORADO LAW
A. The Small Loan Statutes.
Colorado has no general usury statute. Although the judgment
rate of interest is fixed at 6 percent per annum,5 debtor and creditor
are free to contract in writing for a higher amount in the absence
of one of the special statutes described below.' When there is no
agreement between the parties to a loan, the rate of interest is fixed
at 6 percent per annum.7
The oldest small loan statute is the 1913 Loan Law 8 which
regulates persons engaged in the business of making secured loans in
excess of $1,500 where interest of more than 12 percent per annum
is charged.' Lenders in this category must obtain a license from the
state banking commissioner." ° Disclosure is required of the terms
of the loan, including the interest rate, although there is no require-
3 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) [hereinafter referred to and
cited as C.C.P.A.).
4 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE [hereinafter referred to and cited as U.C.C.C.].
References are to the Final Draft version as promulgated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-1-2 (1963).
Id. § 73-1-3.
7 Id. § 73-1-1.
8 Id. § 73-2-1 et seq.
9 At first glance it would seem that an individual making a one-shot loan would not
be a person "engaged in the business of making loans." But see COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 73-2-8(3), 73-3-2(6) (1963).
10 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-2-1, 73-2-2 (1963).
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ment that the interest be expressed in terms of an annual percentage
rate." The maximum rate of interest is set at 2 percent per month.'
The Colorado Consumer Finance Act,13 passed in 1955, similarly
provides for licensing of lenders who make loans below $1,500 at an
interest rate of 12 percent per annum or more. The lender is
authorized to disclose his interest rate as a percentage per month,14
and a rate ceiling is set at 3 percent per month for loans of $300. For
that part of the loan between $300 and $500 the maximum is 112
percent per month, and for that part of the loan between $500 and
$1,500 the maximum is 1 percent per month.' 5 Oddly enough, the
rate ceiling imposed on loans under $1,500 is lower than that imposed
on loans above $1,500. Wage assignments are prohibited in connec-
tion with loans made under the Consumer Finance Act.' 6 It seems
somewhat anomalous that there is no prohibition against wage assign-
ments under the 1913 Loan Law. Similarly, it is not clear why the
1913 Loan Law applies only to secured loans, while the Consumer
Finance Act regulates loans both secured and unsecured. Such incon-
sistencies are probably a product of the fact that the two statutes
were drafted at different times by different legislators. It should be
noted that banks and credit unions are exempt from the Consumer
Finance Act"7 and banks are exempt from the 1913 Loan Law.' 8
B. The Time-Price Doctrine.
The time-price doctrine, under which a credit sale of goods or
services is made at a price higher than the cash price and where the
time-price differential is deemed not to constitute interest within the
meaning of small loan legislation, has long been the rule in Colo-
rado. 9 In line with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the
United States, the Colorado Supreme Court has stood firm against the
attacks on the time-price doctrine which have succeeded in several
states. For example, in the leading case of Elder v. Doerr'° the
Nebraska Supreme Court found that a time-price sale which complied
with the requirements of the Nebraska Installment Sales Act was in
fact a usurious loan. Although there seems to be no logical reason
11 Id. § 73-2-5.
12 Id.
Is Id. § 73-3-1 el seq.
14Id. § 73-3-14(1)(b).
15 ld. § 73-3-14(1) (a).
16 Id. § 73-3-17.
1
7 Id. § 73-3-3(2).
18 Id. § 73-2-10.
19 Theodore Roosevelt Agency, Inc. v. GMAC, 156 Colo. 237, 398 P.2d 965 (1965);
Cady L. Daniels, Inc. v. Fenton, 97 Colo. 409, 50 P.2d 62 (1935) ; Gilbert v. Hud-
gens, 92 Colo. 571, 22 P.2d 858 (1933).
20 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963).
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for drawing a nice distinction between interest on a loan and time-
price differential on an installment sale, the time-price doctrine may
be necessary to the very existence of installment selling in a state
with a restrictive general usury ceiling. Because of this economic
necessity, the time-price doctrine has become the law of nearly every
state.2 ' In Colorado, however, which has no restrictive usury ceilings,
the time-price doctrine seems academic, at least with respect to install-
ment sales of tangible personal property.
C. The Installment Sales Statutes.
Colorado has two retail installment sales laws which, in spite of
the time-price doctrine, impose ceilings on time-price differentials
comparable to the interest ceilings under the small loan laws. The
Retail Installment Sales Act22 and the Personal Property Installment
Sales Act2" contain both rate ceilings and disclosure provisions.
Under the Retail Installment Sales Act, which requires licensing of
sales finance companies who purchase installment paper from car
dealers,24 the time-price differential ceilings run from 16 percent to
34 percent on a simple annual basis, depending upon the type of
car involved.2" The Retail Installment Sales Act only covers install-
ment sales where a purchase money security interest in the car is
retained by the seller or the finance company. The Retail Installment
Sales Act authorizes interest rebate on prepayment according to the
"Rule of 78." 26 It also limits delinquency charges to 5 percent of
the amount of an installment in default.
27
The core of the Retail Installment Sales Act is the disclosure
requirement imposed on every retail installment sales contract. Dis-
closure in writing on the face of the contract must be made of the
following items in order: the cash price of the motor vehicle; the
amount of any cash downpayment or trade-in; the unpaid balance
of the cash price; the cost of any insurance charged to the purchaser
including a bold-face statement that the contract does not provide for
liability insurance if such is the case; the amount of the time-price
21 In addition to Nebraska, the time-price doctrine has been criticized in the State of
Arkansas. See Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952).
2 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-1 et seq. (1963).
23 Id. § 121-2-1 et seq.
2
4 Id. § 13-16-2.
25Id. § 13-16-6(6) (a).
2
6Id. § 13-16-7(1). The "Rule of 78" is an accounting principle comparable to the
sum-of-the-years-digits method for depreciating property. Under the "Rule of 78" the
interest rebate which must be given to the borrower on prepayment is less than would
be obtained by calculating the outstanding balance by a straight-line method. The
"Rule" reflects the fact that the borrower has the use of more than half of the credit
for the first half of its life and should pay for the use of this larger amount if the
transaction is terminated by prepayment.
2
7Id. § 13-16-6(1) (c).
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differential stated as a lump sum; the time balance owed by the
retail buyer and his payment schedule; and the time selling price,
which is the sum of the down payment and the time balance.28
Although this is a comprehensive disclosure scheme as far as it goes,
the rate of the time-price differential is conspicuously missing.
Therefore, under the Retail Installment Sales Act the buyer will not
necessarily know what rate of interest he is paying for the privilege
of purchasing the car on time, nor how this rate would compare to
taking out a loan at a bank and using the proceeds to buy the car. As
will be pointed out subsequently, such rate disclosure is the heart and
soul of the C.C.P.A. and the U.C.C.C.
The Personal Property Installment Sales Act 29 regulates retail
installment sales of personal property other than motor vehicles. It
contains ceilings on time-price differentials ranging from 30 percent
on that part of the credit under $300 down to 20 percent on that part
of the credit in excess of $1,000.30 Like the Retail Installment Sales
Act, the Personal Property Act contains the 5 percent per installment
limitation on delinquency charges 3' and an authorization for interest
rebate according to the "Rule of 78. ' 3'  The disclosure scheme in
the Personal Property Act is similar to that found in the Retail Install-
ment Sales Act, with no required disclosure of the rate of the time-
price differential. The disclosure in both statutes is primarily aimed
at defining for the purchaser the spread between the cash price and
the time price.
33
Both the Retail Installment Sales Act and the Personal Property
Act contain hidden rough spots and inconsistencies. For example,
the coverage of both statutes extends to all "retail" transactions
where the goods are purchased for reasons other than resale.3 4 Thus
both statutes by their literal terms apply to retail business transactions
such as the installment purchase of heavy equipment by a corporation.
It seems obvious that the purpose of installment sales legislation is
to protect the individual consumer rather than the businessman who
is in a position to protect himself. It is for this reason that the
Colorado statutes would more properly distinguish between "con-
sumer" and "nonconsumer" transactions rather than "retail" and
"wholesale" transactions. Nevertheless, this strange anomaly is firmly
imbedded in the statutes.
- Id. § 13-16-6(2) (a).






33 For a discussion of all the present Colorado statutes see A. HELLERSTEIN & L. HEL-
LERSTEIN, CHATTEL MORTGAGES IN COLORADO (6th ed. 1963).
3 4
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-16-1(3), 121-2-2(2) (1963).
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It is also not clear why the Colorado installment sales statutes
apply only to secured transactions and not to unsecured installment
selling, where the consumer would seem to need just as much aid.
Nor are the two statutes free from inconsistencies between them.
Although they both contain limits on delinquency charges, only the
Retail Installment Sales Act prohibits cognovit notes.35 It seems fair
to ask, Why the distinction? Finally, neither of the installment sales
statutes requires any disclosure of the rate of the time-price differen-
tial even though the small loan laws require some disclosure of the
rate. This seems to be an unwitting and unnecessary extension of the
time-price doctrine into the area of disclosure. In short, although
present Colorado installment sales legislation serves a useful function,
its inconsistencies illustrate the need for a more uniform treatment of
problems in this area.
D. The Uniform Commercial Code.
There are also special consumer provisions in the Uniform
Commercial Code. 6 Article 9, dealing with secured transactions,
includes a special category of "consumer goods," defined as those
goods "used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes." 37 Recognizing that most consumer credit trans-
actions have a local flavor, the Code requires that financing state-
ments covering consumer goods are to be filed with the clerk and
recorder in the county of the debtor's residence rather than with the
Colorado Secretary of State.38 The Code expressly provides that a
transaction subject to Article 9 is also subject to other Colorado
statutes regulating small loans and retail installment sales, and that
in case of conflict such consumer legislation controls.39
Furthermore, the consumer under the Code is protected by cer-
tain specific Code provisions. A security agreement under Article 9
must specifically identify and itemize consumer goods,4" although
only a general description of nonconsumer goods is required; such a
provision presumably deters the creditor from grabbing the kitchen
sink. No afteracquired property clauses are permitted to encumber
consumer goods.41 No security interest in consumer goods used by a
family, other than a purchase money interest in a motor vehicle, is
valid unless the security agreement is signed by both husband and
3 5 1d. § 13-16-6(1) (b).
36 Id. § 155 et seq. (1963) [hereinafter referred to as the Code].
37 Id. § 155-9-109(1).
38 Id. § 155-9-401(a).
39 Id. § 155-9-203(2).
40 Id. § 155-9-110.
41 Id. § 155-9-204(4) (b).
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wife.42 If a debtor has paid 60 percent of the cash price of consumer
goods through a loan or time sale, a secured party who repossesses
the collateral must dispose of the collateral within 90 days, by sale,
lease, or otherwise. 43 By contrast, in cases involving nonconsumer
collateral, a secured party who has repossessed may propose to retain
the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation, and such disposition
may be averted only if the debtor objects.44 A consumer who buys
consumer goods having an original purchase price of $250 or less
takes free of a purchase money security interest in the goods where
the seller has relied upon automatic perfection rather than filing a
financing statement.
45
Perhaps the most significant consumer provision in the Code is
hidden in section 2-302, under which a court may render "uncon-
scionable" contracts unenforceable. This broad provision has already
been invoked by the courts to strike down many installment sales
provisions which bear the stamp of the shark, including sweeping
cross-collateral clauses, waivers of defenses, and referral sales pro-
grams.
4 6
E. Other Statutory Protections.
In addition to the consumer legislation discussed above, Colorado
also has statutes regulating industrial banks, the issuance of credit
insurance, and assignments of wages.
The Industrial Bank Act 47 requires the licensing of industrial
banks. Such banks may charge an annual add-on interest rate on loans
not to exceed 10 percent. 48 Colorado is one of the few states which has
no usury statute governing commercial banks. Because the Industrial
Bank Act is not aimed at consumer lending as such, however, it con-
tains no disclosure provisions.
The Colorado Insurance as Security for Loans statute 49 regulates
consumer lending insofar as it authorizes the lender, if it is a duly
42 1d. § 155-9-203(1)(b).
43 1d. § 155-9-505(1).
441d. § 155-9-505(2).
45 Id. § 155-9-302(d) ; Everett National Bank v. Deschuiteneer, 244 A.2d 196 (N.H.
1968).
46 Section 2-302 of the Code has been used to invalidate a clause waiving defenses
against an assignee of a consumer sales contract, Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232
A.2d 405 (1967) ; an excessive cash price or time-price differential, Frostifresh Corp.
v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 964 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; a referral sales plan
in an installment sales contract, In re State of New York, 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275
N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966); and "dragnet" clauses retaining all the consumer
owns- from tables to toothbrush-as collateral for the sale of any item bought
subsequently, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir.
1965). For a general discussion of this matter see Blalock, Unconscionable Consumer
Installment Contracts, 54 A.B.A.J. 279 (1968), and Davenport, Unconscionability
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121 (1967).
47 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-17-1 et seq. (1963).
48 Id. § 14 -17.7(2) (a).
49 Id. § 73-4-1 et seq.
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authorized insurance agent, to sell credit life insurance to the bor-
rower in an amount not exceeding the face amount of the loan. Such
insurance must be written upon a declining term basis. The credit
insurance statute specifically states that any gain to the lender in the
form of an insurance premium "shall not be deemed to be an addi-
tional or further interest, discount or charge in connection with such
loan and said lender may receive commissions on the premium paid
for such insurance .... ."" In other words, the present Colorado
statute makes it clear that any credit insurance premium is not to be
considered as an additional interest cost of the loan. As will be
pointed out below, this provision will be changed by both the
C.C.P.A. and the U.C.C.C. The credit insurance statute also states
that a borrower is not required to purchase credit insurance from the
lender as a condition precedent to the making of the loan.5'
The Colorado statute governing assignments of wages"2 is con-
sumer-oriented legislation in the sense that its requirements are so
cumbersome to the creditor that the taking of wage assignments in
consumer credit transactions is extremely unattractive. The statute
provides that no employer or debtor shall honor any assignment of
wages unless it is in writing and for a fixed definite part of the
wages "earned or to be earned within 30 days from the date of such
assignment." 53 A copy of every wage assignment must be given or
mailed by registered mail to the employer within five days of its
execution, with another copy to the wage earner. Each assignment
must be recorded in the county of the wage earner's residence. These
requirements are in addition to the standard filing requirements
imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
II. THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
Because of the social implications of installment credit and the
notoriety given to marginal credit practices, consumer legislation has
been much in the spotlight recently. The most significant new piece
of legislation is the Consumer Credit Protection Act passed by Con-
gress last spring, eight years after its introduction by Senator
Douglas, and signed by the President on May 29, 1968. The C.C.P.A.
is divided into four parts: Title I covers truth in lending, Title II
makes loan sharking a federal offense, Title III imposes restrictions
on garnishment, and Title IV establishes a national commission on
consumer finance.
50 Id. § 73-4-2.
51 Id. § 73-4-3.
52
Id. § 80-15-1 et seq.
53 Id. § 80-15-1.
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A. Truth in Lending.
Title I, Truth in Lending, constitutes a significant innovation in
consumer legislation and an abrupt departure from the prior law of
Colorado and other states. The gist of Truth in Lending is the re-
quirement that all consumer loans, 54 consumer credit sales, 55 and
"open end credit plans" 56 contain a disclosure of the "finance charge"
as an "annual percentage rate." 57 As in the Uniform Commercial
Code, credit transactions disguised as leases or assignments are cov-
ered. 8 Business and commercial transactions, stockbroker margin
loans, transactions involving governmental agencies, and nonreal
property credit transactions in excess of $25,000 are all excluded
from coverage by Truth in Lending." The "finance charge" is
defined as the sum of all direct and indirect charges imposed by
the creditor as an incident of the extension of credit, including
(1) interest or time-price differential, (2) service or carrying charges,
(3) loan fees, (4) fees for credit investigations, and (5) premiums
for credit life insurance if the coverage by the insurance is a factor
in approval by the creditor of the extension of credit.6" By contrast,
premiums for property or liability insurance need not be included
as part of the finance charge if they are itemized by the creditor and
the debtor is clearly informed of his right to choose where to buy
such insurance.61 Similarly, filing fees and taxes need not be included
as part of the finance charge if they are itemized for the benefit of
the debtor.62 Although consumer real estate mortgages are covered
by Truth in Lending, the finance charge for such transactions need
not include such items as title insurance premiums, fees for various
closing documents, escrows for future payments of taxes and insur-
ance, appraisal fees, and credit reports.
3
The social policy behind requiring disclosure of the finance
54 C.C.P.A. § 127.
55 
Id. § 128.
56 Id. § 129. An "open end credit plan," which includes revolving charge accounts,
revolving bank credit, and credit card transactions, is defined as "a plan prescribing
the terms of credit transactions which may be made thereunder from time to time
and under the terms of which a finance charge may be computed on the outstanding
unpaid balance from time to time thereunder." Id. § 103 (i).
57 Truth in Lending only covers "creditors who regularly extend, or arrange for the
extension of, credit for which the payment of a finance charge is required" where
the money, property, or services which are the subject of the transaction "are pri-
marily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes." Id. § 103(f), (h).
This definition of consumer transactions reflects the language of the Code § 9-109( 1).
58 C.C.P.A. § 103(g). See Code § 1-201(37).
59 C.C.P.A. § 104.
60 Id. § 106.
61 Id. § 106(c).
6 2 Id. § 106(d).
63 Id. § 106(e).
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charge as an annual percentage rate is articulated in the congressional
declaration of purpose appended to Truth in Lending:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be en-
hanced and the competition among the various financial institutions
and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would
be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed use
of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers.
It is the purpose of this title to assure a meaningful disclosure
of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit.64
Truth in Lending is not a usury statute; it does not fix rates in
any way. Like the 1933 Securities Act, it is a disclosure statute. As
the declaration of purpose states, the intent of the statute is to encour-
age maximum competition among purveyors of consumer credit by
requiring that they all disclose the price of their wares in a common
language. The draftsmen presumably felt that only through a com-
mon language - annual percentage rate - can the consumer shop
for credit in the same way he shops for durable goods.
All persons in the business of extending credit - commercial
banks, finance companies, credit unions, department stores, automo-
bile dealers, credit card franchisers - will now be required to dis-
close the cost of that credit as an annual percentage rate. 65 For
example, an add-on or discount rate of 5 percent will have to be
disclosed as a simple annual percentage rate of approximately 10
percent.66 Similarly, a monthly revolving credit charge of 1Y percent
will have to be translated into an annual percentage rate of 18 per-
cent. The theory of Truth in Lending is that a uniform rate dis-
closure based on the declining principle balance rather than on the
original balance, most clearly reflects the popular understanding of
the cost of credit. The consumer, who is bombarded by a bewildering
variety of ways to measure the cost of credit extended to him, will
now have the benefit of a uniform measuring stick. Although some
economists and businessmen argue that demand for consumer credit
is insensitive to variations in credit costs, and that the consumer is
concerned only with the amount of his monthly payments, it seems
hard to deny that the consumer is extremely sensitive to fluctuations
of cost in other segments of the market such as mortgage lending
64 Id. § 102.
65 Id. §§ 127-29. Truth in Lending will become effective on July 1, 1969. Id. § 504(b).
66Under both add-on and discount methods of computing credit charges the rate is
geared to the initial face amount of the credit, rather than to a declining balance. A
5 percent add-on rate approximates a 10 percent simple rate in an installment trans-
action because the consumer has, on the average, use of only half of the credit.
There has long been a taboo in the credit industry, stemming from the medieval
days of Thomas Aquinas and Peter Abelard, that people will refuse to pay an interest
rate in excess of 6 percent. Perhaps this is why monthly, add-on, and discount rates
are used instead of a simple annual rate. If such is the case, Truth in Lending might
put something of a damper on the demand for consumer credit.
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rates and savings account returns. Truth in Lending will, for the
first time, put short term consumer credit on a par with mortgage
lending, savings accounts, and commercial loans, which have long
involved the use of a simple annual percentage rate.
Perhaps the most heated criticism emerging from the voluminous
committee hearings on Truth in Lending is that translation of finance
charges into a simple annual percentage rate cannot be done mathe-
matically. For example, the 112 percent monthly service charge for
credit cards or department store revolving accounts bears no neces-
sary relation to the amount of time during which the consumer has
use of the goods without paying for them. Most plans have a 30-day
"grace period" during which payment may be made without any
charge, and the service charge is in any case arbitrarily imposed
against the balance of the account as of a particular billing date, a
balance which fluctuates constantly rather than declines steadily.
Therefore, the actual interest rate for revolving credit is often less
than 1112 percent per month. Nevertheless, the proponents of the Act
argued that disclosure of 18 percent per year is no less accurate than
112 percent per month. Furthermore, the Federal Act allows depart-
ment stores the choice of simply multiplying their monthly rate by 12 or
using an average effective annual rate based upon their own cumula-
tive experience.17 Before Truth in Lending becomes effective on
July 1, 1969, the Federal Reserve Board will publish final regulations
and conversion tables to facilitate translation of different types of
finance charges into an annual percentage rate.6"
Truth in Lending requires disclosure with respect to three basic
types of credit transactions: credit sales, consumer loans, and revolv-
ing credit ("open end consumer credit"). For credit sales, there must
be a written disclosure somewhat as presently required under the
two Colorado retail sales acts discussed above. The downpayment
is subtracted from the cash price. To the resultant is added an
itemized sum of taxes, property and liability insurance premiums,
and official fees, none of which are part of the finance charge. This
yields the "total to be financed."69 Then there must be disclosure of
the total finance charge over the life of the transaction, except in the
case of first mortgages on homes.7" Then the finance charge must
67 C.C.P.A. § 127(a) (5) (A).
68 Id. § 107(d).
69Id. § 128(a)(5).
70 Id. § 128 (a) (6). The exception for first mortgages seems proper in that such obliga-
tions are so often refinanced or assumed by new purchasers that the debtor rarely pays
the total finance charge over the life of the mortgage.
Truth in Lending also contains a unique provision allowing a homeowner 3 days
to rescind a second mortgage on his dwelling. Id. § 125. This provision was appar-
ently aimed at debt consolidation services which often take a second mortgage on the
debtor's residence. Compare the 3-day "cooling-off" period for home solicitation
sales under the U.C.C.C. mentioned at p. 700 infra.
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be expressed as an annual percentage rate - not add-on, not discount,
not monthly."' Then there must be a statement of the repayment
schedule, late charges which may become payable, and a "clear
identification" of any property in which the seller retains a security
interest. 2 This requirement of a "clear identification" of collateral
dovetails neatly with the unique Colorado Uniform Commercial Code
provision which requires a specific itemization of consumer goods
collateral in the security agreement.7v Finally, prepayment according
to the "Rule of 78" is authorized so long as the calculation is consistent
with regulations of the Federal Reserve Board.
4
For consumer loans, the disclosure requirements are similar.
The proceeds of the loan available for use by the debtor are added to
the charges not included in the finance charge to arrive at the "total
amount to be financed." 75 The aggregate amount of the finance
charges (except for first mortgages) must be disclosed, as well as the
finance chiarge expressed as an annual percentage rate. Repayment
schedules, late charges, and itemization of any security must also be
disclosed, as with credit sales."
In the realm of revolving bank credit, retail charge accounts,
and credit cards, there must be the following disclosures before an
account is opened: (1) the condition under which a finance charge
may be imposed, including a statement of any "grace period";
(2) the method of determining the balance upon which the finance
charge will be imposed; (3) the method of determining the amount
of the finance charge; and (4) the annual percentage rate of the
finance charge arrived at by multiplying the monthly rate by 12, or
such an annual rate to be calculated according to Federal Reserve
regulations as is based on the creditor's average experience.77 At each
billing period the bank, department store, or credit card company
must transmit to the consumer a statement which, in addition to
disclosing all activity in the account during the billing period, reiter-
ates the disclosures which were made when the account was opened."
Whether credit sales, consumer loans, or revolving credit is
involved, disclosure of the finance charge as an annual percentage
rate is the primary departure which the C.C.P.A. makes from prior
Colorado law and established practice in the credit community. Fail-
71 Id. § 128(a) (7).
7
2 Id. §§ 128(a) (8)-(10).
73 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-9-110 (1963).
74 C.C.P.A. § 121.
7
1Id. § 129(a) (3).
71 Id. § 129(a) (6)-(8).
7 Id. § 127(a).
'78 d. § 127(b).
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ure by creditors to comply with the disclosure requirements of Truth
in Lending exposes them to liability in the amount of twice the
finance charge, attorneys' fees, and costs of any action by the con-
sumer to enforce such liability."'
Truth in Lending also contains provisions relating to credit
advertising. The basic rule is that where any specific credit terms are
advertised, the creditor must practice what he preaches, and all of the
material terms must be set forth. For example, no credit advertise-
ment may state that a specific periodic installment amount can be
arranged "unless the creditor usually and customarily arranges credit
payments or installments for that period and in that amount." 8 0 The
same rule applies to down payments. 8 ' Finally, no advertising may
set forth any of the terms of an open end credit plan or any other
consumer credit sales or loans unless nearly all of the disclosures
required in connection with such a transaction are set forth in the
advertisement. 82 If any advertisement purports to state a rate for the
finance charge, it must be put in terms of an annual simple per-
centage.83
B. Extortionate Credit Transactions.
Title II of the C.C.P.A., which makes loan sharking a federal
crime, distinguishes among (1) making extortionate extensions of
credit,8 4 (2) financing extortionate extensions of credit,85 and
(3) collection of extensions of credit by extortionate means. 86 An
extortionate extension of credit is defined as "any extension of credit
with respect to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the
debtor at the time it is made that delay in making repayment or
failure to make repayment could result in the use of violence or other
criminal means to cause harm to the person, reputation, or property
of any person." 8" The penalty for any violation is up to $10,000 or
imprisonment for 20 years, or both. 8 In a prosecution under Title II,
the fifth amendment may be suspended and immunity granted to any
witness.80 This is an obvious attempt to reach the bowels of organ-
ized crime through informants.
79 ld. § 130.
80Id. § 142(1).
81Id. § 142(2).
82 Id. §§ 143, 144.
8 Id.
8
4 Id. § 892.
8 Id. § 893.
8
6 Id. § 894.
8
7Id. § 891(6).
88 Id. § 892(a).
89 Id. § 895.
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C. Restrictions on Garnishment.
Title III exempts from garnishment 75 percent of any individ-
ual's weekly wages, or $48, whichever is moreY0 This is a legislative
attempt to promote greater uniformity in the bankruptcy laws9' and
to help relieve the consumer from the pressure of being forced into
bankruptcy. The 75 percent exemption, which becomes effective on
July 1, 1970, is substantially broader than the present Colorado
exemption of 35 percent for non-heads-of-households and 70 percent
for heads-of-households.9 2 Furthermore, Title III prohibits for the
first time any employer from discharging an employee because his
wages have been subject to garnishment for any one indebtedness. 3
The requirement in the present Colorado garnishment statute that no
garnishment may be issued except in aid of judgment 4 will be
unaffected by the new law. 5
D. National Commission on Consumer Finance.
Title IV of the C.C.P.A. establishes a national commission to
"study and appraise the functioning and structure of the consumer
finance industry, as well as consumer credit transactions generally." 9'
The commission is given broad investigative powers to help dull
sharp practices in the credit world."
III. THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
The Consumer Credit Protection Act exempts from its disclosure
requirements any class of credit transactions subject to a state law
which requires disclosure substantially similar to the C.C.P.A. and
which contains adequate provisions for enforcement. " The Revised
Final Draft of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code recently adopted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has been tailored to conform to the federal act.99 Therefore, subject to
regulations to be promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, adop-
tion of the U.C.C.C. would provide Colorado and other states with
a unique opportunity to preempt federal legislation and keep the
90 d. § 303.
91 Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress to establish "uni-
form laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States."
92 Compare with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-2-4 (1963).
93 C.C.P.A. § 304.
94 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-1-9(2) (1963).
95 C.C.P.A. § 307 (1).
96 Id. § 404(a).
97 1d. § 405.
98 Id. § 123.
99 One major change which had to be made in the Revised Final Draft of the U.C.C.C.
was the possible inclusion of credit life insurance premiums as part of the finance
charge to be disclosed as an annual percentage rate. Compare §§ 2.109, 2.202, 3.109
and 3.202 of the Tentative Final Draft (Working Draft No. 8) with those same
sections of the Revised Final Draft.
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regulation of consumer credit on the state level. 100 Viewed in this way,
enactment by Congress of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the
disclosure provisions of which will not come into effect until July 1,
1969, provides a strong argument in favor of early enactment of the
U.C.C.C.
In Colorado, the C.C.P.A. will alter both the small loan laws
and retail sales acts as discussed above, none of which require dis-
closure of the finance charge as an annual percentage rate. In addi-
tion, the garnishment statute is modified by the C.C.P.A., as is the
credit insurance statute. Rather than worry about which portions of
the prior Colorado statutes are repealed and which are retained in
light of the federal act, it seems an opportune time to enact the
comprehensive U.C.C.C. as a needed house cleaning of statutes which,
as pointed out above, are riddled with anomalies and inconsistencies
in any case. If Colorado chooses to be among the first states to adopt
the U.C.C.C., regulation of consumer credit can be retained at the
state level without a sacrifice of uniformity, modernization and
clarification can be injected into this vital area of the law, and the
scattershot approach to consumer credit legislation will be replaced
by a single comprehensive statute.'
The U.C.C.C. enters all three basic areas of consumer credit
regulation - disclosure requirements, rate ceilings, and limits on
creditors' rights.' 2
A. Disclosure.
As with the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the disclosure
policy of the U.C.C.C. is to encourage "shopping for credit" by giving
to consumers a common language by which to measure the cost of
credit offered by different sellers and lenders. For both "consumer
credit sales" '03 and "consumer loans"'o4 an itemization of the trans-
100 Even if the U.C.C.C. is adopted, those provisions of the C.C.P.A. covering extortion-
ate credit transactions and establishing a national commission on consumer finance
would continue in effect. The same is true of disclosure in credit advertising.
101 For a somewhat outdated capsule summary of the U.C.C.C. by its principal draftsmen,
see Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND.
& Co ,. L. REV. 441 (1968). For an excellent and up-to-date collection of articles
on the U.C.C.C. see 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387-519 (1968).
102 Beyond the scope of this discussion is Article 6 of the U.C.C.C. which provides an
administrator for the U.C.C.C., defines his powers, and provides administrative
remedies for enforcement. In Colorado, this administrator might be the Colorado
Banking Commissioner. Article 7, which authorizes the formation and licensing of
nonprofit debt-counseling corporations, will not be promulgated by the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws until after 1968.
103 This is defined in U.C.C.C. § 2.104 to mean a sale of goods or services purchased
primarily "for a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose." A sale of an
interest in land is not included unless the credit service charge exceeds 10 percent as
an annual percentage rate.
104 This is defined in U.C.C.C. § 3.104 to mean loans in which the debt is incurred pri-
marily "for a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose" and excluding
loans of 10 percent or less upon the security of an interest in land.
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action and a disclosure of the annual percentage rate of the finance
charge is required, as under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The
itemization requirement for a consumer credit sale is basically the
same as that required under the federal act.'" 5 The same is true for
disclosure with respect to consumer loans.10 6 As with the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, any misleading advertising is prohibited.
10 7
Going beyond the federal act, however, the U.C.C.C. also contains
express disclosure provisions with respect to refinancing of credit
sales,' 08 consolidation of separate credit sales' 09 or consumer loans," 0
and deferral charges."' As with the federal act, detailed disclosure of
the terms of revolving credit must be given at the time a revolving
charge account or revolving loan account is opened, as well as at the
time of each billing cycle."
2
Another rather unique departure under the U.C.C.C. is the
requirement of full disclosure of the terms of bona fide consumer
leases." 3 The lessor must provide to the lessee: (1) a brief descrip-
tion of the goods covered; (2) the amount of any payment required
at the inception of the lease; (3) the amount payable for official fees;
(4) the amount and description of other charges not included in the
rental payments; (5) a description of any insurance; (6) payment
schedules; (7) a description of the lessee's right of termination, if
any; and (8) a statement of any liabilities imposed upon the lessee
at the end of the term."
14
In order to conform to the Consumer Credit Protection Act, the
other disclosures required under the U.C.C.C. are in part patterned
after the federal act, particularly in the requirement of annual per-
centage rate translation. The beauty of the U.C.C.C. is that it offers
an opportunity to preempt federal regulation in this vital area.
B. Rate Ceilings.
A major change from present Colorado law would be imposition
by the U.C.C.C. of general rate ceilings with respect to consumer
105 See the discussion at pp. 689-90 supra. See also U.C.C.C. § 2.306.
106 See U.C.C.C. § 3.306. Calculation of the credit service charge for credit sales is
found at § 2.304, and calculation of the loan finance charge for consumer loans is
found at § 3.304.
107 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.303, 3.303.
108 Id. § 2.307 requires disclosure, at the time of the refinancing, of (1) the unpaid bal-
ance before refinancing, (2) rebates to which the buyer might otherwise have been
entitled, (3) any additional charges in connection with the refinancing, (4) the
amount financed under the refinancing, (5) the amount of the credit service charge,
(6) the unpaid balance, and (7) the repayment schedule under the financing.
1l9 Id. § 2.308.
1o Id. § 3.307.
I11 Id. § 3.308.
112 Id. § 3.309.
113 The term "consumer lease" is defined in U.C.C.C. § 2.106.
114 U.C.C.C. § 2.311.
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credit sales and consumer loans. If the U.C.C.C. is adopted in Colo-
rado, a general usury schedule for consumer credit will be applicable
for the first time. On the other hand, the rate ceilings imposed by the
U.C.C.C. distinguish between sales and loans, thus paying lip service
to the time-price doctrine." 5 In setting relatively high rate ceilings
on consumer credit transactions, instead of attempting to fix rates,
the draftsmen of the U.C.C.C. intended to avoid the rigid inflexibility
which could result from rate ceilings set too near the market. In
addition, the U.C.C.C.'s policy of encouraging competition and easy
entrance into the consumer credit field".6 would be thwarted by
setting the rate ceilings too low.
Maximum charges are set for credit sales, consumer loans, and
revolving credit. With respect to the finance charge for credit sales
other than revolving charge accounts, the ceiling is set at 36 percent
for that part of the unpaid balance which is $300 or less, 21 percent
for that part of the unpaid balance between $300 and $1,000 and
15 percent for that part of the unpaid balance in excess of $1,000; in
the alternative, the creditor is authorized to charge a flat rate of 18
percent on all amounts." 1  For revolving charge accounts the ceilings
are 24 percent on balances of $500 or less and 18 percent on balances
in excess of $500."' There are two classes of consumer loans:
supervised loans and nonsupervised loans. Supervised loans are de-
fined as those where the interest rate is in excess of 18 percent." 9 A
supervised lender must obtain a license from the appropriate state
official based upon his "financial responsibility, character and fit-
ness."' 2 0  The "character and fitness" criterion for entry into the
consumer credit market has been attacked by the American Bankers
Association as too liberal and is the primary reason that the ABA has
not endorsed the U.C.C.C.; in Colorado, however, this "free entry"
provision makes no change in the present law, except that the ceiling
on nonsupervised rates is increased from 12 percent to 18 percent.'
2 '
The rate ceiling on supervised loans, including revolving loan
accounts, is the same as for credit sales: 36 percent for that part of the
115 The draftsmen of the U.C.C.C. state that sales credit and loan credit are treated
separately because of the danger that the courts of a state which had not adopted the
U.C.C.C. might otherwise be tempted to rely on its rejection of the time-price doc-
trine. See Prefatory Note to Tentative Final Draft of UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE, Extra Edition, CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE, May 13, 1968, at xix. This
seems to be a rather hollow rationale.
116 See U.C.C.C. § 2.201, Comment 1.
117 U.C.C.C. § 2.201'(2).
118 Id. § 2.207(3).
119ld. §§ 3.501(3), 3,201(1).
120d. § 3.503(2). Organizations such as national or state banks are exempt from the
licensing requirements as "supervised financial organizations." Id. § 1.301(17).
121 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-3-5(2) (1963).
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unpaid balance which is $300 or less; 21 percent for that part of the
unpaid balance between $300 and $1,000; 15 percent for that part of
the unpaid balance which is more than $1,000; or a flat rate of 18
percent of all balances.' 22 Multiple agreements to obtain a higher rate
of interest on supervised loans are prohibited." 8 In addition, a super-
vised loan the principal of which is $1,000 or less may include neither
a security interest in real property 2 " nor a provision for attorneys'
fees. 2" The rate ceiling on a nonsupervised loan, including revolving
loan accounts, is set at 18 percent.'
20
In all credit sales and loans, delinquency charges are limited to the
lower of $5 or 5 percent of the unpaid amount of any installment not
paid within 10 days after its due date.' 2 7 In the alternative, the parties
are free to contract for a deferral charge, which must be disclosed in
advance,1 2 ' a refinancing charge not in excess of the regular rate
ceilings,' 29 and a finance charge on consolidation, subject to the regu-
lar rate ceilings.' Finally, rebate upon prepayment is in general
calculated according to the "Rule of 78." 1"1 Neither rates for credit
life, health, and accident insurance nor limits on entry into the insur-
ance field are imposed by the U.C.C.C., although it does regulate
credit insurance in a broad way. Article 4 of the U.C.C.C. covers
the various types of insurance which may be offered by the cred-
itor in connection with a consumer sale, consumer lease, or con-
sumer loan. It authorizes the providing of credit life, accident, and
health insurance by the creditor 18 2 so long as the amount charged by
the creditor does not exceed the premium charged by the insuror 8
and so long as ratable rebate upon prepayment is allowed." With
respect to credit life insurance, the originally scheduled term of the
insurance must extend until maturity of the debt, 35 and the amount
of insurance must not initially exceed the debt. 8 With respect to
property insurance, the amount, terms, and conditions of the insur-
12U.C.C.C. § 3.508(2).
13 Id. § 3.509.
2 4 Id. § 3.510(1).
"15 Id. § 3.511'(1).
1l1d. § 3.201(1), (4).
1 7 Id. §§ 2.203, 3.203. The U.C.C.C. contains no express provision prohibiting accelera-
tion clauses in consumer promissory notes unless a court were to find such a clause
"unconscionable." See id. § 5.107.
128 Id. §§ 2.204, 3.204.
129 Id. §§ 2.205, 3.205.
130 Id. §§ 2.206, 3.206.
131 1d. §§ 2.210(3), 3.210(3).
132 1d. § 4.104(1).
133 Id. § 4.107(1).
13
4 Id. § 4.108(1).
13 5 Id. § 4.201 (2).
36 Id. § 4.202(1) (a).
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ance must be reasonable in relation to the debt.1"' With respect to
liability insurance, no such policy may be charged against the debtor
unless the insurance "covers a substantial risk of liability arising out
of the ownership or use of property related to the credit trans-
action."' 138 Since it requires that credit life insurance premiums be
included as part of the finance charge if insurance coverage is a factor
in the approval of the credit, Article 4 of the U.C.C.C. alters the
present Colorado credit insurance statute, 13 9 which automatically
excludes them.
C. Limits on Creditors' Rights,
In addition to disclosure requirements and rate ceilings, the
U.C.C.C. contains a number of provisions restricting creditors' rights
in consumer credit transactions. 4 ' The draftsmen appear to recognize
that concepts which play a vital role in commercial business trans-
actions should not automatically be carried over into the realm of con-
sumer credit.' 4 ' The Uniform Commercial Code begins to draw such a
distinction in its sections especially protective of the consumer142 and
in its deference to conflicting state consumer credit legislation.'
48
The final step is taken by the U.C.C.C. in a number of wide-ranging
provisions designed to restrain overreaching by lenders and sellers in
the consumer credit realm.
1. No Waiver of Debtors' Rights
The U.C.C.C. provides that none of the rights and benefits given
to a consumer by the statute can be waived except as expressly pro-
vided.' 44 This is an extension of a similar provision in the Uniform
Commercial Code.' 4
2. Negotiable Consumer Notes Outlawed and Assignee Subject
to Defenses
A common problem which confronts consumers arises because
of the commercial practice of selling or "discounting" the consum-
er's promissory note. The merchant sells the note to a bank or
other lending agency at a discount and thereby has a steady cash
flow with which to run his business. The consumer, however, if he
131 Id. § 4.301.
138 Id. § 3.303.
139 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 73-4-3 (1963). See text accompanying note 51 supra.
140 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.401 et seq., 3.401 et seq. These provisions do not apply to sales of land
or loans primarily secured by land.
141 For a good general discussion of this area see Helstad, Consumer Credit Legislation;
Limitations on Contractual Terms, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 519 (1967).
142 See discussion at pp. 684-85 supra.




See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 155-9-501(3) (1963).
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has defective merchandise, finds that he cannot threaten to hold back
payment until the merchandise is made good because the merchant is
no longer the one to whom payment need be made. The consumer is
thus put in the posture of having to pay for the defective merchandise
while trying to have the defect remedied. In order to alleviate this
consumer problem, the U.C.C.C. provides that a seller or lessor may
not take a negotiable instrument other than a check in connection
with a nonagricultural consumer credit transaction. 4 ' The result of
this provision is to prevent the assignee from being a holder in due
course who would otherwise take the note free from defenses which
could be asserted by the consumer. A holder is not in good faith if he
takes a negotiable promissory note made by a consumer, 147 although a
holder who in good faith does not know of the paper's consumer
origin may qualify as a holder in due course who takes free of de-
fenses. As a corollary to the negotiable note provision, an assignee
of consumer credit paper is subject to all real and personal defenses
or claims of the buyer or lessee, regardless of any waiver provision.'
48
These limitations do not apply with respect to consumer loans.
3. Balloon Payments Prohibited
The balloon payment, defined by the U.C.C.C. as a final install-
ment on a loan or sale which is more than twice as large as the
average of the other payments, is prohibited unless the buyer or
borrower has the right to refinance the amount of the balloon pay-
ment at the time it is due without penalty and upon terms no less
favorable than the terms of the original note. 4" An exception is
provided when the repayment schedule is adjusted to seasonal income
of the consumer.' 50
4. Limitations on Security
Although there is no limit on purchase money security, an install-
ment seller is prohibited from taking a security interest in other
146 U.C.C.C. § 2.403.
147 Id. "Since the prohibition against negotiable notes in consumer financing will be
well-known in the financial community after enactment of this Act, professional
financers buying consumer paper will normally not qualify as holders in due course
with respect to notes taken by dealers in violation of this section and negotiated to
them." Id. § 2.403, Comment.
148 Id. § 2.404, Alternative A. Alternative B provides that an assignee may take free of
defenses when there is an agreement by the buyer or lessee not to assert defenses and
when the consumer does not raise a defense, in writing, within 3 months after the
creditor's notice of the assignment.
Both of these alternatives dovetail with § 9-206 of the Code which authorizes
an agreement not to assert defenses against an assignee "subject to any statute which
establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods." COLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 155-9-206(1) (1963).
149 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.405, 3.402. The "balloon" is often used as a device by which the con-
sumer can be forced to refinance the balance at a higher rate. A parallel section pro-
vides that a nonagricultural consumer lease may not provide that a performing lessee
shall be liable for an amount upon termination of the lease in excess of twice the
average rental. Id. § 2.406.
150 Id. §§ 2.405, 3.402.
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property of the buyer except (1) in land to which the goods sold are
affixed and where the debt is more than $1,000, (2) in goods upon
which services are performed or to which the goods sold are annexed
and where the debt is more than $300,' and (3) under the cross-
collateral provisions discussed below. The lessor of a consumer lease
may not take a security interest in any property of the lessee, includ-
ing the leased property.15 Except for the prohibition against real
property security in a supervised loan of less than $1,000,153 there are
no security limitations with respect to consumer loans under the
U.C.C.C.
A closely related section covering consumer sales provides that
a consumer credit seller may secure the debt arising from a subsequent
sale (1) by contracting for a security interest in other property if as
a result of a prior sale it is still subject to an outstanding security
interest in favor of the seller, or (2) by contracting for a security
interest in the property subsequently sold as security for the previous
debt."' As a prohibition against "cross-collateral clauses" under
which no collateral is released until debts arising from all sales are
paid," the U.C.C.C. establishes a first-in-first-out rule for both
installment sales' 56 and revolving charge accounts.'
57
5. No Assignment of Earnings
The U.C.C.C. flatly prohibits assignments of earnings as security
for a consumer sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan.' 8 These
provisions would repeal entirely the already terribly cumbersome
Colorado statute governing wage assignments.' 59
6. Restrictions on Promissory Notes
In addition to the prohibition against negotiability in consumer
promissory notes, the U.C.C.C. also outlaws cognovit notes'0 ° and
either prohibits attorneys' fee clauses altogether' or limits them to




13 Id. § 3.510.
1541d. § 2.408(1).
155 For an excellent example of such a clause in operation with devastating effect see
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
156 U.C.C.C. § 2.409(1).
157 Id. § 2.409(2).
158 Id. §§ 2.410, 3.403.
159 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-15-1 et seq. (1963). See text accompanying notes 52
& 53 supra.
60 U.C.C.C. § 2.415 '(notes evidencing sales), § 3.407 (notes evidencing loans). Al-
though there is no statute or case in Colorado expressly condemning confessions of
judgment by consumers, some Colorado courts refuse to enforce such clauses. The
Code is neutral on the subject of cognovit notes. See Coco. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-
3-112(1) (d) (1963) and Official Comment 2 thereto.
161 Alternative A, U.C.C.C. §§ 2.413, 3.404.
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15 percent of the unpaid debt after default,162 depending on which
alternative is adopted by the state. Finally, no default charge may be
imposed except for reasonable expenses incurred in realizing on a
security interest.' 
3
7. Restrictions on Deficiency Judgments
With respect to a consumer credit sale, if the seller repossesses
goods which had a cash price of $1,000 or less, he is prohibited from
seeking a deficiency judgment. 6 Conversely, if the seller elects to
bring an action against the buyer, he is prohibited from repossessing
or levying execution upon the collateral.' 65 This doctrine of election,
which does not apply to consumer loans, is directly contrary to the
Uniform Commercial Code, which authorizes cumulative remedies
and would presumably continue to apply to consumer loans.' 66
8. Restrictions on Garnishment.
With respect to garnishments, the U.C.C.C. goes beyond the
Consumer Credit Protection Act in providing that no employer may
discharge any employee because he has received garnishment sum-
monses, no matter how many.'
6 7
9. Limitations on Referral Sales and Home Solicitation Sales
The U.C.C.C. outlaws the referral sale device' 68 and provides a
3-day "cooling-off" period during which any home solicitation sale
may be rescinded in writing by the consumer.' 69
CONCLUSION
The revolution in consumer credit turns on the assumption that
the consumer is a special breed of debtor who requires protection
which is not necessarily appropriate for business or commercial
debtors. The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act takes a giant
step in attempting to bring about this protection by requiring disclo-
sure of consumer credit finance charges as an annual percentage rate.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code also adopts the above
method of disclosing credit and in addition makes other changes from
present Colorado law which are especially significant from the con-
sumer's point of view. The provision outlawing negotiable promissory
notes and its significance to the consumer have already been dis-
182 Alternative B, U.C.C.C. §§ 2.413, 3.404.
163 U.C.C.C. §§ 2.414, 3.405.
1
8 4 Id. § 5.103(2).
165 d. § 5.103(6).
16 6 COO REV. STAT. ANN. § 155-9-501(1) (1963).




69 Id. § 2.502 (1). Compare the 3-day "cooling-off" period for second mortgages on resi-
dences under the C.C.P.A., discussed at note 70 supra.
VOL. 45
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION
cussed.170 Another provision in the U.C.C.C. which is especially
important to the working consumer is that which prevents an
employer from discharging an employee because of garnishee sum-
monses, no matter how many the employer has received regarding
that employee.' 7' This assures the debtor that he will not lose his
means of repaying his debt if he falls in arrears on it. The creditor,
however, still may use the garnishment method of collecting his debt.
A third U.C.C.C. provision which should be of great help to
protect the consumer who does not understand the workings of the
business world is the inclusion of a 3-day "cooling-off" period during
which any home solicitation sale may be rescinded by the consumer.'
17 2
The intent is of course to help the housewife who falls into the
clutches of a high pressure door-to-door salesman and in the calm
light of morning, or more likely when her husband comes home,
decides she really does not want the item after all.
These three provisions are representative of the attempt of the
U.C.C.C. to protect consumers, especially that segment of the con-
sumer population which most needs help, the people who are not
aware of the pitfalls which may await them in credit dealings. Since
the U.C.C.C. seems to accomplish this protection while keeping con-
sumer credit regulation at the state rather than the federal level, it
is hoped that the Colorado legislature will be persuaded to pass this
important statute.
17o See text accompanying note 146 supra.
1i U.C.CC. § 5.106.
172 Id. § 2.502 (1).
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